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The Effect of Takeover Activity on Corporate Research and Development Bronwyn H. Flail
Introduction
Economists generally agree that research and development activity is an important factor in the long-term growth of the economy. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects on corporate research and development of the recent increase in takeovers in the United States. R&D is interesting in this context because the firm's decision to invest in these activities is viewed as a long-term commitment. If a wave of mergers distracts managers from all but decisions for the near term, we might expect that R&D performance would cease to be optimal.
To shed some light on this question, this paper uses evidence on the characteristics of mergers that actually take place. To quantify the role of R&D in acquiring and acquired firms, I explore the factors that determine the probability of an acquisition as well as the valuation of these factors at the time of the takeover. The model of acquisition choice I have built for this purpose is tractable for estimation and allows for heterogeneity across firms and therefore unique synergies to a merger.
In particular, different targets are worth different amounts to acquiring Bronwyn H. Hall is assistant professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley. and a research economist at the National Bureau of Economic Research.
The author is grateful to Zvi Griliches and Timothy Bresnahan for ongoing discussions, to Alan Auerbach. Charles Brown, Lawrence Lau, Tom Macurdy, Ariel Pakes. and John Shoven for comments at various times during this research, and to Chris Hall for help with the data collection. Comments by seminar participants at Stanford University. the University of Santa Clara. Boston University, Harvard University. MIT. the University of Chicago, and the University of California, Berkeley, were also helpful in preparing this chapter. Some of this work was done while the author was a Sloan Dissertation Fellow and a John M. Olin graduate research fellow, and she thanks these foundations for their support. The data preparation was partially supported by a National Science Foundation Grant and by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The question whether increased merger activity is a good thing for Altei the economy in general remains unresolved and unlikely to be resolved COWS" by focusing solely on the experience of the firms involved. Jensen (1986) and others have argued that mergers represent an unambiguously poscash fi itive shifting of assets into their best use and provides the best mechsuch t anism for ensuring that managers act in the shareholders' interest. A howev more neutral view would be that the level of merger activity is just a rate by-product of this asset shuffling and has no particular externality; it of the fluctuates from time to time in just the same way as the number of a now shares traded on the stock market fluctuates from day to day. The Sorn negative view, associated with Scherer (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1986) , same d sees acquired entities ("fines of business" in his empirical work) as that fir almost always suffering declining profitability after merging, and Scherer prospe inferred from this result the conclusion that increased acquisition acother fi tivity is likely to be a wasteful thing for the economy as a whole.
that fir Roll (1986) provided what is essentially an efficient financial markets in the phenomenon observed by Scherer, although that was not his specific aim. He claimed that we see the transactions only produc where the managers of acquiring firms misperceive the value of the term ii target firm as too low. Hence, according to Roll, even under efficient flounce markets we find more negative surprises than positive ones. This picthat th ture of acquisitions implies that an increase in mergers is associated On t, with an increase in corporate "hubris" (Roll's term), which is not good of for the economy as a whole. But for this view to hold in the presence for Tot of efficient markets, the offer made by an acquiring firm should be was pc associated with a drop in its share price, since shareholders should be ficient capable of divining that the decision to buy is likely to be a bad one the R&D, activities that tend to be highly uncertain. Under the two and tat assumptions of no scale economies or diseconomies in R&D over the the L ke the relevant range and perfect capital markets, the two strategies should, in fact, be perfect substitutes for the firm. ing for Alternatively, the view that some acquisitions are used as "cash cows" to service the debt incurred to finance them also implies a i(l986) negative effect on R&D activity. An easy way to increase short-term ly poscash flows at the expense of long-term profits is to cut spending on mechsuch things as R&D. Evidence that this indeed takes place is not, rest. A however, evidence that it is the wrong thing to do. The long-mn profit just a rate may not have been high enough to justify the premerger R&D level ility; it of the acquired firm, and cutting back on R&D may be precisely what iber a now presumably better management should do. y. The
Some evidence exists on a few of these questions. Using roughly the 1986), same data as mine, Addanki (1985) found no support for the hypothesis )rk) as that firms with larger R&D programs were more attractive acquisition cherer prospects. If anything, innovators were less likely to be acquired than ion acother firms. A Securities and Exchange Commission study (1985) found Ic. that firms that were taken over invested less in R&D than other firms iarkets in their industry. The authors of the study did not control for size, that however, which could account for some of the result. The same study is only produced a related piece of evidence on the market valuation of longof the term investments such as R&D: The 20-day excess return for an an- of which 301 were acquired by 1983, I found that once I had controlled esence for Tobin's q at the beginning of the period, the R&D-to-assets ratio uld be was positively related to the probability of being acquired. The coefbe ficient was consistent with a shadow price for the R&D capital stock .d one.
of around 0.6 times that for the physical capital stock of the firm. In t seem other words, firms for which the measured ratio of market value to book value was high because they also had intangible assets, such as the firm, such as its capital stock, R&D stock, industry, tax characj will p teristics, and so forth. The value function V can be thought of as the The er present discounted value of the revenue streams that could be generated about from these assets either alone or in combination with other assets. For finds it the moment I do not necessarily identify V(X1) with the current stock piece market value of the firm, although in a world with fully informed, large I rational shareholders and efficient markets, V(X1) would of necessity show I
be the price at which this bundle of assets traded. The reason I do not highes make this assumption here is the well-known fact that acquisitions take metric place at a significant positive premium over the preannouncement stock will ev market value (Jensen and Ruback 1983 , and the references therein), stock, This fact implies that some agents place a higher value on X1 than the The market does. Thus, it would be a mistake to impose at the outset a there constraint that the market for corporate assets is in a fully informed the ty equilibrium, since it is the disequilibria that drive the acquisition process. The implications of this assumption for the estimation strategy econo will be clarified after I present the model. acqui-I assume that in each period (a year, in my data) the optimal configor less uration of corporate assets changes because of shocks to the economic characenvironment. The acquiring firms are subscripted f, and the possible red the targets, which consist of my entire sample of firms, are subscripted i.
•s there Each firm in my sample can acquire any other firm; if it does so, the e R&D increment to the value of the acquiring firmj attributable to the new rally, is configuration of assets is denoted If we assume for the moment ) were that only one acquisition is possible in each period, firmj will buy firm gesting i (that is, I and I will find it beneficial to combine) if rate of
where P1 is the pricef will have to pay for i's assets. The last conditions in ensures that there is a positive gain from the acquisition; many potential assets acquirers will find that it holds for none of the targets and hence will indirect utility function directly, since the consumers are assumed to tics of be price-takers. In this market one cannot assume that the price firm haracj will pay for the assets is independent off's attempt to purchase them.
as the The empirical evidence is that by making a bid, firmj reveals something erated about the value of the assets that was not previously known and hence s. For finds it necessary to bid above the current trading price. In a companion stock piece (Hall l987b The difficulty with this function as written is that the gains from different acquisitions are likely to have extremely heteroskedastic and possibly non-normal disturbances because of the large size range of the firms in the data set.3 I would rmed like to choose a specification that mitigates this problem as much as possible, since the multinomial logit estimates will be biased in this case. My solution to the problem is to specify the acquisition choice ver problem in terms of rates of return to acquisitions rather than total gains. This specification implies a condition of the form: Mussa 1974; Abel 1983 Abel ,1985 form of the multinominal logit probability, the coefficients of the acstored t quiring firm's characteristics, 13k, will not be estimable since they cancel changec from the numerator and denominator, so that only X1 and will 
4, but
The data from which I draw my sample consist of 2,519 manufacturing firms that appeared at some time on the Industrial and Overthe-Counter Compustat tapes over the years 1976-85. The basic features of the 1976-based subset of this sample were described in Bound et at. (1984) and Cummins et al. (1986) , and the construction of the whole sample is described in Hall (1987a; 1987c Note: The employment columns (E) show the total employment, in thousands, in the firms during the year prior to their exit. The columns and rows do not sum because a few exits remain unidentified as to reason for or year of exit.
1980s (note that my numbers for 1986 are undoubtedly incomplete). In addition, a large part of the increase in the acquisition rate between the 1976-81 period and the 1982-86 period is due to the increase in acquisition activity by privately held and foreign firms. Weighted by employment, those acquisitions tripled, while the acquisitions by publicly traded firms increased by one-third. In this case acquisition by a "privately held" firm means acquisition by a firm that does not file 10-K forms with the Securities and Exchange Commission on a regular basis and therefore is not in the sample; some of these firms are leveraged buyouts by management or other investors (known as "taking the firm private"). Because the privately traded acquisitors perform roughly half the acquisitions, and these acquisitions are likely to be a nonrandom sample (for example, they are on average about 50 to 60 percent smaller), throughout the paper I will try to compare results for my subsample of acquisitions with those for the whole sample. Unfortunately, it is not in general possible to obtain data on the pre-and postacquisition experience of these buyers, which is a limitation of this study. Some simple statistics on all the acquisitions are presented in table 3.2a, where I show the industrial breakdown for the firms in the manufacturing sector in 1976 and 1981 and for the subset of firms that were blidy acquired between the two periods 1977-8 1 and 1982-86. To give an idea of the relative importance of acquisition activity by industry, I also report the total employment in these firms. Judging by the percentage of an industry's employees who were affected by acquisition uidated during both periods, the industries with the greatest activity were food, or textiles, and machinery. In fact, over a third of the employees in the nkrupt manufacturing sector subject to takeover were in these three industries.
E
The other industries with a substantial number of employees involved in acquisitions were rubber and plastics, fabricated metals, and machinery. There does not seem to be much of a pattern, except when 0 we look at the second period. There, the industries with the largest 14 acquisition share seem to be the older, somewhat technologically back-17 ward industries that are in the process of upgrading to meet foreign (6 competition. Is the acquisition activity in these industries primarily oriented toward consolidation and shrinkage of the industry, or is there 10 also an attempt to buy smaller firms in the industry that have been ii successful innovators? I will defer this question until we examine the R&D-to-sales ratios of the stayers and exiters.
Of the approximately 600 firms that were acquired, I was able to in the identify 342 that were acquired by firms in the Industrial or OTC Cornause a pustat files; of these, there are about 320 for which I have good data on both the buyer and the seller. This set excludes any firms that were acquired by foreign firms, as well as those acquired by privately held e). In firms. It does include nonmanufacturing firms that acquired firms in ween the manufacturing sector. The characteristics of the subset for which se in I have data on the buyer are given in Table 3 .2b. Although these data d by account for only half the acquisitions made during this period, they pubcover two-thirds of the employees involved in acquisitions (two million by a out of three million). The table also shows the industrial distribution t file of the firms doing the acquiring. There are fewer firms in this column gular since some made more than one acquisition during the period. le- Table 3 .2b demonstrates that there is no overwhelming pattern to 'iking the merger and acquisition activity; the distribution of buyers and sellers is quite different from industry to industry but not in a particularly f the meaningful way. The largest share of firms were taken over in the mple aircraft, machinery, and electrical machinery industries, while the air-
craft, electrical machinery, and petroleum industries had the largest mple share of firms performing acquisitions. This last fact is a consequence it is of the fact that these industries are also the ones with the largest number ition of employees per firm on average.
In tables 3.3a and 3.3b, I investigate the differences in R&D intensity table between exiting firms and those remaining in the industry, and then manbetween acquiring firms and those they acquired. Among those firms were acquired by other firms in the publicly traded manufacturing sector, and R1 are nonzero, so that the numbers presented are for all firms. , 1976-86 in only two of the four nonparametric tests. The same conclusion holds looking at three-year changes around the time of acquisition (not reported here). The conclusion is that there is no overwhelming evidence that acquiring firms experience a change in R&D behavior around the time of acquisition. Because firm size is systematically related to both R&D intensity and the probability of being acquired, the data in the preceding tables are difficult to interpret in detail. In the next section 1 therefore attempt to quantify the determinants of acquisition further by estimating probability models with more than one explanatory variable.
Estimating the Probability of Entering the Acquisition Market
Before I present results for the full-blown multinomial logit model of acquisition matches, I present estimates of the "marginals" of such a model. These estimates are not marginals of the distribution of the multinomial logit model in the statistical sense, since they cannot be S obtained by aggregating over the choice set,5 but they summarize the data from the perspective of the acquiring and the acquired firms sepnacarately. They also provide an indication of the change in the sample when I restrict the data to the approximately 300 acquisitions for which I can observe both partners.
Assume that the reduced form for the probability of being acquired in any one year can be written as a logit function of various firm characteristics:
where X,, represents the characteristics of the firm. The estimates of 13 and a, can then be obtained with a conventional maximum likelihood logit estimation. The same type of model can also be used to estimate the probability that firmj will make an acquisition in year t, conditional on the firm's characteristics Xi,.
The model of acquisition sketched in section 3.2 uses the assets of 4 the firms to predict their valuation and, hence, the gain from merger. To keep things simple, I focus on two assets: capital. stock (including all plant and equipment, inventories, and other investments), and the ms stock of knowledge capital. These two assets tend to be the most significant ones in a simple stock market value equation. For the buyers and sellers in 311 transactions that took place between 1977 and 1986, I have constructed estimates of the book value of the physical assets in current dollars and the R&D capital held by those firms one year ds before the acquisition, using the methodology described in Cummins eet al. (1985) . Adjustments for the effects of inflation on the book value of the physical assets have been applied, and R&D capital has been depreciated at a rate of 15 percent per year (see Griliches and Mairesse 1981, 1983) . I then deflated these variables to be in 1982 dollars, using a fixed investment deflator and an R&D deflator (Cummins et al. 1985) , respectively, since I would be pooling across years. Note: RIS is the deflated R&D-to-sales ratio. The deflator for sales is the producer price index for finished goods (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics) and that for R&D is according to Griliches method, following Jaffe (see Cummins et al. 1985 for details). The columns labeled "acquired firms" show the average R&D-to-sales ratio for the 314 firms that were acquired by other firms in my sample, measured one year before the acquisition (RIS) and, for the combined firm, measured from one year before acquisition until one year later (A RIS). The columns labeled "nonacquired firms" show the average R&D-to-sales ratio and the change in that ratio for the firms that were not acquired, averaged over the 1977 to 1986 period. These data are based on several hundred observations per industry. The last two columns show the difference in RIS between the two groups of firms and the i-statistic for the hypothesis that the difference is zero.
Firm's nra;.. I nonacquired firms" show the average R&D-to-sales ratio and the change in that ratio for the firms that were not acquired, averaged over the 1977 to 1986 period. These data are based on several hundred observations per industry. The last two columns show the difference in RIS between the two groups of firms and the t-slatistic for the hypothesis that the difference is zero. I estimated equation (14) using, as regressors, size (the log of capital stock), the ratio of R&D stock to capital stock, and a trend variable. I also included a dummy variable for the more technologically oriented industries (those with RIS greater than 1 percent in table 3.3a) to check whether the R&D effects were in reality industry effects. Table 3 .4 shows these estimates. The first column pertains to the complete sample of acquisitions for which data existed; the other columns are for two subsets: those firms acquired by private or foreign firms, and those firms acquired by the firms in my sample (mostly manufacturing, with a few nonmanufacturing firms).
The estimates for the two groups are quite different, confirming the findings in the simple statistics of table 3.3a. The privately traded acquisitions show a much steeper positive trend than the others, and all the other variables have predictive power. Size, R&D intensity, and whether the firm is in a science-based industry have a significant negative effect on the probability of its being acquired by a privately held or foreign firm. On the other hand, these variables have no effect on the probability of its being acquired by a publicly traded manufacturing .027 (023) -.0l5 (.049) .264 (079) log K = Log of deflated capital stock of the firm in the year before it acquired another firm or was itself acquired K/A = ratio of R&D stock to assets in the same year the probability of making an acquisition; that probability rose toward y held the end of the period; and R&D intensity is not important. When I on focus on the two subperiods, a difference does emerge. In the 1980s turing the firms making the large acquisitions had a somewhat lower R&D intensity than the other manufacturing firms, suggesting some substitution between R&D performance and acquisition activity. I also included the Tech variable in these equations, but it was completely insignificant in all periods. This result is therefore not the result of a shift of acquisition activity toward low-technology industries.
Results for the Matching Model of Mergers nufac-

Ffrms
I now turn to estimates of the multinomial logit model of the match between the acquiring and the acquired firms. Here I confine my sample '.028) to the firms that made acquisitions; that is, the estimates are conditional .167) on a firm having chosen to enter the takeover market, and they describe • 122) the choice made once the firm is in the market. A reasonable way to .020) augment this model so that it also describes the decision to enter the market would be to build a nested logit model where the decision to -make an acquisition is logically prior to the choice of target. The es--86 timates obtained here are consistent for the lower branch of such a -nested logit model (McFadden 1978 (McFadden ,1984 , although the interpretation of the coefficients would change. The upper branch would be somewhat multinomial logit model estimated here as a descriptive summary of the data observed, even if the underlying interpretation of the V funclions as determining the acquisition probability is suspect.
lou,
The results of estimation conditional on an acquisition's being made in equation (7), with the choice set consisting of the chosen alternative The term is not identified in the conditional logit model because it cancels from the numerator and denominator of equation (6) Note: The standard error estimates are robust heteroskedastic-consistent estimates; they differ from the conventional estimates by less than 10 percent in almost all cases. logA = log of deflated assets in the year before the acquisition, where assets equal the sum of capital stock, inventories, and other investments (K/A) = ratio of R&D stock to assets in the year before the acquisition
D(Same md.) = I, if the acquiring and the acquired firms are in the same two-digit industry The subscriptj indexes the acquiring firms, and i indexes target firms. The coefficient estimates are for the probability that firmj chooses firm i when it makes an acquisition. Models I and 11 are described more completely in the text.
with respect to their R&D intensity. More interesting, the shadow price for the R&D intensity of the target is an increasing function of the size and the R&D intensity of the bidding firm. This finding may arise partly because of management's preference to acquire firms similar to those in their own industry. Nevertheless, the simple correction of controlling for the match being in the same industry had very little effect on the magnitude of the estimates, although it did reduce the R&D match coefficient somewhat, as expected. Further investigation of this finding, particularily within and across industries, seems warranted.
What do these estimates tell us about the valuation of the R&D stock of the firm at the time of acquisition? Unfortunately, we cannot say very much about this without making strong assumptions about the way in which v(X,), the price paid for the acquisition, is determined, since the estimated coefficients of the target firm's characteristics will contain terms from both the (for example, and the v(X,) equation.7 This problem limits our ability to interpret equations (15) beyond pointing out that the shadow value placed on R&D capital is steeply rising with the acquiring firms' R&D intensity.
. On the other hand, it is possible to know something about the price was valued more highly at the margin by the firms that took them over.
the This result at least hints that successful innovators are being taken over. In addition, the evidence suggests that larger gains are generated by ac-271 quisitions where both firms involved have high R&D intensity.
ults I also found evidence that much of the acquisition activity by private and foreign firms in the domestic market was directed toward firms and industries that were relatively less R&D intensive and had a weaker technological base, so that this kind of acquisition activity cannot be a major factor in causing a shift in focus away from innovation activity, unless we take the view that managers in these industries saw them. (Hall, Cummins, and Schnake 1986 The introduction of the paper poses several possible relationships between merger activity and R&D spending. These follow from conjectures about discretionary managerial behavior, not derived as the "optimal" behavior of managers with particular objectives and conComi straints. It is not obvious to me, however, that the picture would be sharpened by such an effort. it is profitable forj to do so (as Hall emphasizes) but only when it is makes not more profitable for some other firm k to acquire I. It is true that quisitio competition for i among potential suitors would raise the price of I, and when the dust clears the acquisition is profitable for only one firm.
(broket Yet the information that it was not profitable in the end for the other prove e firms to acquire I is not explicitly included in the estimation. Second, of the price that j will ultimately pay for I is taken as a function of i's Assembling the data for this study (Hall was part of the team that did so) was a sizable task, and it would be bad form to overemphasize MIT the potential for omitted-variable bias in the "lean, mean" empirical ii oods specification that data limitations impose. Constructively, a quick surg vey of the determinants of R&D and the determinants of merger activity found in previous studies might give one a better feel for the direction any such bias is likely to take.
Hall presents several interesting results, whose full explanation will provide a likely topic for future work. Some of the conclusions will benefit if a few years of "merger mania" expand the sample to be etween studied. There is surely room for disagreement about one's favorites; (broken down by industry and type of buyer). This information should other prove extremely valuable in considering the possible causes and effects of merger activity. of i's Finding a sensible framework for a detailed econometric analysis of ue of merger activity is not a simple task. The spectrum of forces that the literature refers to as motivating mergers is large and depends on many factors that are difficult to quantify. The best we can do is look for a way to summarize the data that makes some "reduced form" sense, than V1[, and then be very careful in the way we interpret the estimates. and only one coupling will actually take place. Moreover, the price of -firm i is unlikely to depend only on firms i's own assets. Simple ecothat nomics tells us that the price firm i sells for must be between the values if we I assigned to firm i by the potential purchasers with the first and second dition highest evaluations of firm i's assets. Since these evaluations are likely gives to depend on the characteristics of these two potential buyers, so will P1. What is lacking in this system of equations is some allowance for the workings of the market as a whole. (a') states that if j purchases i, the value of i to j must be at least as form great as the value of i to any other potential buyer (or else the other woul acquiror would make the purchase; note that must also be greater than V.
[X1] which is the value of i as an independent entity). Equations (b') and (c') filter in the price of acquisition by insuring that it lies between the values assigned to i by the two potential buyers with the highest evaluations of i.
There are also problems with the kind of frictionless, completeinformation, equilibrium approach embodied in (a'), (b'), and (c'). For example, this model is not complete without an additional rule specifying the set of potential buyers, or the set over which the maximum is taken (this problem also plagues Hall's framework). Still, I think it is useful to begin with a set of equations that have some simple economic justification and then try to build in the appropriate complexities as best we can. Note that the difference between (a) and (a') is in the comparison set. Statement (a) compares to other purchases firm j could make; (a') compares it to the values attached to i by other potential buyers. If we were to use the type of logit specification Hall implements, it would be just as easy to estimate one version as the other.
The "equilibrium" strategy can be pushed further than this. Statements (a'), (b'), and (c') use only the equilibrium conditions in the current period. There are also equilibrium conditions in prior periods. Since in period a' -1, firm i existed as a separate entity, it should be the case < = Pr', where the subscript a' -I denotes evaluations made in the period prior to the merger, so that Pr-' is the observed value of the ith firm in period a' -I. Thus, if we let t be the merger period, putting together the equilibrium conditions from the period prior to merger with the period after the merger gives us the statements -Vj--if j actually makes the acquisition, and -'(Xv') Pfif k does not. Although combining information from different periods should provide us with more precise estimators if the assumptions of the model are correct, it also places a heavy burden on the (clearly inappropriate) assumption that every possible buyer evaluates all possible purchases in every period. In fact, evaluating potential acquirees is a costly and time-consuming task. An alternative strategy would be to provide a model of when an evaluation process is initiated. A model of when the costs of acquisition are actually incurred could also provide us with a formal way of determining the set of potential buyers (and this, in turn, would do away with the need to invoke the independence-of-irrelevant- Here firmj's evaluation of firm i's assets (X1k) depends on firmj's characteristics (Zjr). I think this is an intuitive way of looking at the reduced form relationships between the characteristics of the acquiring firm and those of the acquired firm. My only recommendation would be to try to augment the list ofcharacteristics (theXkand the Zr) and to allow for a disturbance term in the equation determining the a)k (it is difficult to quantify all the factors that make firm i's assets attractive to firmj). It would be particularly useful if we could find and use variables that might capture the effects of some of the alternative explanations of merger activity. I imagine that all these tasks are in Hall's list of things to do. 
